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FDA-Required Tobacco Product Inserts & 
Onserts–and the First Amendment 
ERIC N. LINDBLOM, MICAH L. BERMAN, AND JAMES F. 
THRASHER*  
ABSTRACT 
In 2012, a federal court of appeals struck down an FDA rule requiring graphic 
health warnings on cigarettes as violating First Amendment commercial speech 
protections. Tobacco product inserts and onserts can more readily avoid First 
Amendment constraints while delivering more extensive information to tobacco users, 
and can work effectively to support and encourage smoking cessation. This paper 
examines FDA’s authority to require effective inserts and onserts and shows how FDA 
could design and support them to avoid First Amendment problems. Through this 
process, the paper offers helpful insights regarding how key Tobacco Control Act 
provisions can and should be interpreted and applied to follow and promote the 
statute’s purposes and objectives. The paper’s rigorous analysis of existing First 
Amendment case law relating to compelled commercial speech also provides useful 
guidance for any government efforts either to compel product disclosures or to require 
government messaging in or on commercial products or their advertising, whether 
done for remedial, purely informational, or behavior modification purposes. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 22, 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
(Tobacco Control Act) became law, specifically directing the U.S. Food & Drug 
Administration (FDA) to issue regulations requiring graphic health warnings on all 
cigarette packs by June 22, 2011,1 which FDA did on that same date.2 Members of the 
tobacco industry challenged the new rule in court, and the D.C. Circuit Court of 
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Corresponding author, Eric N. Lindblom at enl27@law.georgetown.edu. 
1 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012); Pub. L. No. 
111-31, § 201(a). Pursuant to an apparent typo in the Tobacco Control Act, there are now two subsection 
(d)’s in 15 U.S.C. § 1333. This reference refers to the first (d). 
2 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 
2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).  
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Appeals struck down the rule as violating First Amendment protections for 
commercial speech.3 Since then, FDA has supported significant new research 
regarding graphic health warnings, but has not yet taken any other publicly visible 
action to develop or implement any new rule requiring warning labels for cigarettes or 
any other disclosure of information through cigarette packaging or labels. FDA’s May 
2016 final “deeming” rule requires only text-based warnings (no graphics) on the 
tobacco products it put under the agency’s active tobacco control jurisdiction for the 
first time (e.g., e-cigarettes, cigars, hookah).4 
At some point, FDA will likely issue a legally viable final rule that requires either 
graphic health warnings or new, stronger text-only warnings on all cigarette packs. 
However, the amount of information any new warnings could provide consumers 
would be quite limited because of the relatively small size of the packs–and similar 
limitations apply to warning labels on the packaging of most other tobacco products. 
To provide more extensive information directly to tobacco product users, governments 
could communicate through small printed leaflets either placed inside the product 
package (inserts) or temporarily attached to the outside of the product packaging 
(onserts). For example, inserts and onserts are used with prescription and over-the-
counter drugs to provide health warnings, instructions for use, and other information 
directed at making sure consumers understand the related health risks and use the 
products as effectively, safely, and beneficially as possible. For quite different 
purposes, the tobacco companies have used inserts and onserts with their products in 
the form of coupons, collectable cards, and other promotional materials for over 100 
years.5 
To date, however, Canada is the only country or other major jurisdiction that has 
adopted an insert or onsert strategy as part of its tobacco control regulations, requiring 
cigarette pack inserts with cessation messaging since 2001. Studies of the Canadian 
inserts provide further evidence that inserts and onserts can work both independently 
or in conjunction with warnings on tobacco product labels to help consumers make 
more informed decisions about their tobacco product use or to promote other public 
health objectives.6 Indeed, inserts and onserts provide an effective way to reach users 
of different types of tobacco products with relevant information each time they first 
handle or open the package of each tobacco product they use. Although users might 
not read them every time, tobacco product inserts and onserts offer a regularly 
 
3 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir.), aff’g 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 
(D.D.C. 2012). But see American Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (overruling 
one of the core holdings in Reynolds v. FDA). These rulings are discussed more fully, below. 
4 Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as 
Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions on the Sale and 
Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 
28,974 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, & 1143) at 1143.3.  
5 See, e.g., GERARD S. PETRONE, TOBACCO ADVERTISING: THE GREAT SEDUCTION 54–60, 147–48, 
154–55 (1996); ARLENE B. HIRSCHFELDER, ENCYCLOPEDIA ON SMOKING AND TOBACCO 2–3 (1999); 
Joseph G. L. Lee et al., Promotions on Newport and Marlboro Cigarette Packages: A National Study, 
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://0-ntr.oxfordjournals.org .gull.georgetown.edu/content/
early/2016/09/29/ntr.ntw226.full. 
6 James F. Thrasher et al., Cigarette Package Inserts Can Promote Efficacy Beliefs and Sustained 
Smoking Cessation Attempts: A Longitudinal Assessment of an Innovative Policy in Canada, 88 
PREVENTIVE MED. 59, 62–65 (2016); James F. Thrasher et al., The Use of Cigarette Package Inserts to 
Supplement Pictorial Health Warnings: An Evaluation of the Canadian Policy, 17 NICOTINE & TOBACCO 
RES. 870, 872–75 (2015).  
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available resource users can consult whenever motivated to do so, and each time an 
insert or onsert is seen, even if discarded unread, it provides a physical and visual 
reminder of its contents.7 
FDA appears to have all the statutory authority it needs to establish effective inserts 
and onserts for different types of tobacco products. The Tobacco Control Act gives 
FDA extensive authority to regulate tobacco products, including their packaging and 
labeling, to protect the public health, and also provides FDA with separate, additional 
authority to regulate tobacco products to educate consumers about tobacco product 
harms and constituents (some of which specifically mention inserts). But it is not yet 
clear how FDA will interpret and apply its Tobacco Control Act authorities or the 
related specific provisions. Nor is it clear how the courts will interpret those provisions 
when FDA uses them to implement new regulations that will almost certainly face 
legal challenges from members of the tobacco industry. 
Because product onserts can be removed from the outside of the package and inserts 
are not even seen by consumers until after purchase, they interfere with the 
communicative aspects of tobacco product packaging much less than warnings printed 
on the products’ labels. These characteristics should make it much easier for FDA to 
design and require inserts and onserts that can survive the likely First Amendment 
attacks from the tobacco industry. But federal court case law continues to evolve 
relating to First Amendment protections of commercial speech, and considerable 
uncertainty exists as to how this evolving law might apply to new FDA efforts to 
require inserts or onserts. 
Accordingly, this paper outlines the applicable statutory authorities and constraints 
relating to FDA requiring tobacco product inserts or onserts and suggests how they 
might be interpreted and applied most constructively by FDA and the courts. The paper 
then reviews applicable First Amendment law and carefully considers how the content 
and other characteristics of any required tobacco product inserts or onserts could be 
structured to minimize the risk of being blocked by First Amendment challenges. 
Although focusing on tobacco product inserts and onserts, this analysis also provides 
more generally applicable insights into how some key provisions of the Tobacco 
Control Act could be interpreted and applied to best promote the Act’s purposes, and 
on how FDA and other government regulators in other contexts might use product 
disclosures or other packaging, labeling, or advertising requirements to educate 
consumers or protect the public health without encountering First Amendment 
constraints. 
 
7 Research on the efficacy of product inserts and onserts in non-tobacco contexts is sparse. See, e.g., 
D. Grober-Gratz et al., Der Einfluss des Beipackzettels auf die medikamentöse Adhärenz bei 
hausärztlichen Patienten: Influence of Package Inserts on Adherence to Medication in Primary Care 
Patients, 137 DEUTSCH MED WOCHENSCHR 1395, 1400 (2012); Rowa Al-Ramahi et al., Attitudes of 
Consumers and Healthcare Professionals Towards the Patient Package Inserts – a Study in Palestine, 10 
PHARMACY PRACTICE 57 (2012). It is possible that government-required health-information-directed 
inserts and onserts for cigarettes and other tobacco products would be more frequently and carefully 
considered by consumers due to their novelty and the typical absence of any product information or 
directions from sources other than the manufacturers and because the vast majority of smokers have 
concerns about tobacco use and want to reduce related harms or quit. The effectiveness of tobacco product 
inserts or onserts could also be increased by ensuring they could be quickly and easily understood by those 
with lower literacy levels. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Weiss & Stephanie Y. Smith-Simone, Consumer and 
Health Literacy: The Need to Better Design Tobacco-Cessation Product Packaging, Labels, and Inserts, 
38 (3S) AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S403 (2010). 
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I. SPECIFIC FDA AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE INSERTS AND 
ONSERTS TO DISCLOSE TOBACCO PRODUCT CONSTITUENTS 
AND PROVIDE OTHER INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS 
In its amendments to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 
the Tobacco Control Act specifically mentions product inserts when it describes 
FDA’s authority to disclose information to consumers about tobacco product and 
tobacco smoke constituents.8 That text gives FDA authority to “prescribe disclosure 
requirements regarding the level of any cigarette or other tobacco product constituent 
including any smoke constituent . . . if the Secretary determines that disclosure would 
be of benefit to the public health, or otherwise would increase consumer awareness of 
the health consequences of the use of tobacco products.”9 It also states that, although 
such disclosures may not be required “on the face of any cigarette package or 
advertisement,” they may be provided “through a cigarette or other tobacco product 
package or advertisement insert, or by any other means.”10 And “by any other means” 
would presumably include onserts.11 
This language suggests that FDA could require inserts or onserts to disclose 
constituent levels (either generally or specifically) if it determined that doing so either 
“would be of benefit to the public health” or “would increase consumer awareness of 
the health consequences of the use of tobacco products,” even if it was not clear that 
the inserts or onserts would produce any actual reductions in tobacco use or its harms.12 
Based on applicable evidentiary standards, however, FDA would at least need to make 
a reasonable determination, based on available evidence, that the disclosures of 
constituent levels in the inserts or onserts likely would produce either a specific public 
health benefit (without any offsetting public health harms) or an increase in some 
specific type of consumer awareness of tobacco product health consequences.13 [For a 
possible example of such an insert or onsert, see Exhibit One.] 
 
 
 
8 15 U.S.C. § 1333(e)(3) (2012); Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 206 (amending Section 4 of the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).  A tobacco product “constituent” includes tobacco product 
additives and ingredients, as well as any new substances created during the product’s use (e.g., through the 
combustion of the original ingredients). That is expressly stated in Sec. 915(b)(1) and (2) [21 U.S.C. §§ 
387o(b)(1), (2)] and clearly implied in the FCLAA provision, as amended by the TCA, which refers to 
“any cigarette or other tobacco product constituent, including any smoke constituent.” 15 U.S.C. § 1333 
(e)(3). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 1333(e)(3) (2012). 
10 Id.  
11 It is possible that the 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (e)(3) ban on requiring constituent disclosures “on the 
face” of any cigarette packs might be interpreted to block FDA from using this section to require that an 
onsert disclosing constituent levels be affixed to the face of a cigarette package, despites its being readily 
removable from the pack face by the consumer. But, even under such an interpretation, placing such an 
onsert on the back or side of cigarette packs would still be permitted. In addition, this pack-face restriction 
does not, by its terms, apply at all to any tobacco products other than cigarettes or to any FDA onsert 
requirements not based on this specific section of the Tobacco Control Act (although the tobacco 
companies would certainly argue that it should be interpreted to apply to any FDA onsert requirement 
placed on any tobacco product). 
12 Id. 
13 See infra, notes 16–19 and 27–28, and corresponding text. 
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Exhibit One: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A provision adjacent to the Tobacco Control Act’s requirement that FDA “issue 
regulations that require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of 
smoking” on cigarette packs provides FDA direct authority to adjust any cigarette 
warnings it establishes “or establish the format, type size, and text of any other 
disclosures required under the . . . Act” if FDA finds that doing so “would promote 
greater public understanding of the risks associated with the use of tobacco 
products.”14 This text shows that the Act anticipated required disclosures other than 
those in the required warning labels, and further supports the legitimacy of disclosure 
requirements that promote greater public understanding of the risks associated with 
cigarette smoking, from other forms of tobacco use, or from tobacco use in general 
(even if it has not been determined that the disclosures will also reduce tobacco use or 
its harms).15 
 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012); Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 202(b) (amending the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act). Pursuant to the TCA amendments, there are two subsection (d)’s in 15 
U.S.C. § 1333. This reference refers to the second (d). For parallel provisions relating to warning labels 
and disclosures on smokeless tobacco product labels, see Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 205(a) (amending the 
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act at 15 U.S.C. § 4402(d)).  
15 Inserts or onserts could also be used pursuant to Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 915(b)(2), which states that 
FDA “may require that tobacco product manufacturers, packagers, or importers make disclosures relating 
to the results of the testing of tar and nicotine through labels or advertising or other appropriate means, 
and make disclosures regarding the results of the testing of other constituents, including smoke 
constituents, ingredients, or additives, that the Secretary determines should be disclosed to the public to 
protect the public health and will not mislead consumers about the risk of tobacco related disease.” Pub. L. 
No. 111-31, § 915(b)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 387o(b)(2) (2012). They might also be used toward satisfying the 
requirement in Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 904(d)(1), (e) that FDA publish and periodically revise as 
appropriate “in a format that is understandable and not misleading to a lay person, and place on public 
Exhibit One 
 [The above is a speculative, fact‐based mock‐up provided solely for illustrative purposes. 
It is not an actual FDA document.] 
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II. USING FDA’S GENERAL TOBACCO CONTROL AUTHORITIES 
TO REQUIRE INSERTS OR ONSERTS TO PROVIDE 
INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS OR FOR OTHER PUBLIC 
HEALTH PURPOSES 
FDA could also require inserts or onserts pursuant to the much broader and 
extensive authorities the Tobacco Control Act provides the agency to regulate the sale 
and promotion of cigarettes and other tobacco products16 or to establish tobacco 
product standards.17 To issue such regulations, FDA must determine that doing so 
would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health.”18 FDA must make that 
determination “with respect to the risks and benefits to the population as a whole, 
including users and nonusers of the tobacco product, and taking into account— (A) 
the increased or decreased likelihood that existing users of tobacco products will stop 
using such products; and (B) the increased or decreased likelihood that those who do 
not use tobacco products will start using such products.”19 
The “appropriate for the public health” phrase and its statutory subparts have not 
been specifically interpreted by FDA or the courts. However, almost any possible 
reading or definition of the phrase suggests that it would be “appropriate for the 
protection of the public health” for FDA to require inserts or onserts to provide any 
accurate information relevant to the tobacco products and their use by consumers, so 
long as FDA reasonably determined, based on available research and other evidence, 
that doing so would likely produce a significant net benefit to the public health (with 
no risk of any unintended consequences that could completely offset those gains).20 
It is also possible that FDA could use this authority to require such inserts or onserts 
even if FDA were not able to determine whether they would likely produce a net 
decline in overall tobacco use harms but still reasonably found that the requirement 
 
display (in a manner determined by [FDA]) . . . a list of harmful and potentially harmful constituents, 
including smoke constituents, to health in each tobacco product by brand and by quantity in each brand 
and subbrand.” Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 904(d)(1), (e); 21 U.S.C. §§ 387d(d)(1), (e). 
16 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 906(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)(1). 
17 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 907(a)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(3). 
18 FDA could also require inserts or onserts for specific tobacco products that must obtain a new 
product order to permit their legal sale in the United States if FDA determined that requiring the inserts or 
onserts as part of the orders were “appropriate for the protection of the public health” (or were necessary 
for the tobacco products to meet other requirements for qualifying for the orders). Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 
910(c), (d); 21 U.S.C. §§ 387j(c), (d). Similarly, FDA could require inserts or onserts for specific tobacco 
products that must obtain a modified risk tobacco product (MRTP) order to permit their legal sale in the 
United States if FDA determined that requiring the inserts or onserts as part of the orders were necessary 
to ensure that allowing the product on the market would significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-
related disease to individual users and would “benefit the health of the population as a whole taking into 
account both users of tobacco products and persons who do not currently use tobacco products.” Pub. L. 
No. 111-31, § 911(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g)(1); see also Pub. L. No. 111–31, § 911(g)(2); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 387k(g)(2)(A)(i). 
19 Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 906(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)(1). 
20 A plain reading of the terms also suggests that finding an insert or onsert requirement to provide 
constituent information “appropriate for the protection of the public health” would be easier than finding 
that it would “be of benefit to the public health”—as in the FCLAA standard at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(e)(3) -- 
or that its information “should be disclosed to the public to protect the public health” – as required in Pub. 
L. No. 111-31, § 915(b)(2). 21 U.S.C. § 387o(b)(2). 
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was “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” For example, it might be 
“appropriate for the protection of the public health” to require inserts or onserts to help 
prevent youth experimentation with or initiation into tobacco use. Or it might be 
enough to require inserts or onserts simply to provide consumers with information 
about the harmful and potentially harmful constituents in tobacco products or with 
other health-related information that would enable consumers of tobacco products to 
make more informed decisions about whether they consume the tobacco products or 
try to quit, how much they consume, or how they consume them—even if FDA could 
not determine whether doing that would also actually change consumer behavior or 
reduce overall tobacco use or tobacco use harms.21 [For a possible example, see 
Exhibit One, above.] 
This same analysis applies to possible FDA tobacco product insert or onsert 
requirements for other purposes, beyond providing information about constituents, 
that would also be “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” For example, 
FDA might follow the example of its requirements for prescription and over-the-
counter drugs and require tobacco product inserts and onserts to provide tobacco 
product consumers with “Instructions for Use” to inform them how to use the products 
to reduce risks and harms to the user and to others;22 or to provide information on such 
matters as dosage forms and strengths, contraindications, warnings and precautions, 
adverse reactions, drug interactions, use while pregnant, overdosage, and 
dependence.23 [For a possible example, see Exhibit Two overpage.] 
 
21 Some might misconstrue the D.C. Circuit ruling in the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA graphic 
health warnings case as rejecting the idea that simply providing consumers with information could be 
“appropriate for the protection of the public health” because it struck down FDA’s health warning rule as 
not being likely to produce smoking reductions. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In that case, however, the 
court stated that because “[t]he only explicitly asserted interest [by FDA] . . . . is an interest in reducing 
smoking rates,” it would use only that interest in its First Amendment analysis (and not consider other 
possible government interests, such as informing consumers). Id. at 1218 (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, the question of whether it would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” 
solely to increase consumer knowledge about tobacco product harms or how to reduce them was not at 
issue and was not decided by the court. Id. at 1218–19. 
22 See, e.g., General Labeling Provisions: Drugs; Adequate Directions for Use, 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 
(2012). 
23 For examples of FDA-required labeling and inserts for prescription and over-the-counter drugs, 
see DRUGS@FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda (last visited Aug. 12, 2016). 
See also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological 
Products, 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2015); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. et al., Guidance for Industry: 
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products – Implementing the PLR Content and 
Format Requirements, FDA (Feb. 2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecompliance
regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm075082.pdf. Because of FDA’s much broader tobacco control 
authorities, the agency would have considerably more flexibility regarding what it might require in any 
tobacco product inserts or onserts than it does for drugs or other products it regulates.  
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Exhibit Two
Cigarette and Smoking Information from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration 
Besides increasing each smoker’s risk of lung cancer, other cancers, heart disease, and stroke, smoking cigarettes also increases the 
risk of many other health harms, such as diabetes, arthritis, periodontal disease, male erectile dysfunction, macular degeneration, 
blindness, premature aging of skin, and delayed or complicated recovery from injuries or surgery. Similarly, exposing people to 
cigarette smoke increases their risk of lung cancer, heart disease, stroke, and respiratory illness. Smoking or exposure to cigarette 
smoke among pregnant women can cause miscarriages and other pregnancy complications, low birth weight, still born births, and 
sudden infant death syndrome. Fires from cigarettes cause property loss, injury, and death. Eating cigarettes or cigarette butts can 
cause serious gastrointestinal distress, nausea, and vomiting, especially among young children and pets. Research indicates that 
exposure to residues from smoking on clothes, furniture, and other surfaces also causes some health harms and risks. [For more 
information, please go to www.cigarettefacts.gov.] 
                      ______________ 
Directions for Use to Reduce Harms and Risks to Oneself and to Others: The only way to consume cigarettes without any significant 
harms or risks to oneself or others is to consume them without smoking or otherwise ingesting them, and to make sure that that no 
one else obtains the cigarettes who might smoke or eat them. While there is no way to smoke cigarettes without incurring significant 
harms and risks to oneself, consistently following the directions listed below can reduce (but not eliminate) the harms and risks 
smoking causes both to oneself and to others.  
Smoke as few cigarettes as possible. 
Do not inhale. If you must inhale, do not inhale deeply. 
Do not smoke the entire cigarette but smoke only half the length or less. 
Do not smoke every day. 
As often as possible, take an extended break from smoking. 
Do not smoke when pregnant. 
Do not smoke in any enclosed space, such as a car. 
Do not smoke near any other people, pets, or animals. 
Do not smoke indoors or in any location where you or others spend a lot of time. 
Do not expose others to clothes, fabrics, or surfaces exposed to smoking.  
Do not smoke in bed or when tired and at risk of falling asleep. 
Do not leave cigarettes where others might find and smoke them. 
Do not leave cigarettes or cigarette butts where children, pets, or other animals might find and eat them. 
Make sure that each cigarette you finish smoking is thoroughly extinguished and discarded safely and securely. 
                          
Warnings: Harms and risks from smoking and from exposure to smoking are highest among infants and young children and are higher 
than average among persons of any age with the following diseases or medical histories. For example, in extreme cases smoking or 
exposure to cigarette smoke could trigger a fatal heart attack among persons with heart disease. Smoking or cigarette smoke exposure 
among persons with these conditions can also interfere with treatment or recovery. 
  Asthma                           Heart Disease                           Stroke   Lung Cancer    
  Respiratory Illness  COPD  High Blood Pressure                  Other Cancers                             
Peripheral Artery Disease  Macular Degeneration  Diabetes  Recovering from Surgery  
[The above list is not comprehensive, for a complete list please go to www.cigarettefacts.gov.] 
Warning for Women Who Are Pregnant or May Become Pregnant: Smoking or being exposed to secondhand smoke while pregnant 
can create pregnancy and birth difficulties, including miscarriages and stillborn births, and can cause health and developmental risks 
and harms for your child after birth, including sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). 
Warning for Parents and Caregivers: Exposing infants to cigarette smoke can cause sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), and 
exposing any child to cigarette smoke can cause other health and developmental risks and harms.       
                         
Alternatives: Many people who smoke do so to obtain nicotine (e.g., to satisfy their nicotine addiction). Other available products can 
deliver nicotine to consumers with fewer harms and risks to oneself and others than smoking cigarettes, including nicotine 
replacement therapies, such as nicotine gum or patches (the least harmful and risky alternatives), e‐cigarettes, and smokeless tobacco 
products. [For more information, please go to: www.cigarettefacts.gov.] 
                         
 
[The above is a speculative, fact‐based mock‐up provided solely for illustrative purposes. It is not an actual FDA document and www.cigarettefacts.gov is 
not, at this time, an actual government website.] 
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Similarly, FDA could use tobacco product inserts or onserts to notify consumers of 
the benefits from having regular medical tests to diagnose and treat tobacco-caused 
disease early; or to provide information regarding the health benefits from cessation 
or switching to less harmful types of tobacco/nicotine products. Or FDA could use 
inserts or onserts to address existing misleading aspects of cigarettes or other tobacco 
products and their packaging and labels through color coding, certain descriptors, and 
other characteristics that make consumers inaccurately believe that some brands or 
subbrands are less harmful than others.24 
Another possibility would be for FDA to require inserts or onserts specifically to 
provide consumers with information about how to quit using the tobacco product or 
where to get cessation assistance, or even to provide messaging to encourage quit 
attempts and overall cessation.25 Recent studies from Canada, the only country that 
requires any cigarette inserts, suggest that they could be quite effective at increasing 
cessation. The Canadian inserts include eight rotating messages about the benefits of 
quitting and recommendations for increasing the likelihood of successfully quitting, 
which behavioral change theories stress as critical for promoting desired behaviors.26 
[For an example, see Exhibit Three.] Research on the impact of the inserts suggests 
that they promote downstream self-efficacy to quit, increased quit attempts, and 
sustained abstinence from cigarettes.27 
 
 
 
 
 
24 See, e.g., Hua-Hin Yong, et al., U.S. Smokers’ Beliefs, Experiences and Perceptions of Different 
Cigarette Variants Before and After the FSPTCA Ban on Misleading Descriptors such as “Light”, 
“Mild”, or “Low,” 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 2115 (2016); Laura K. Lempert & Stanton A. Glantz, 
Packaging Colour Research by Tobacco Companies: the Pack as Product Characteristic, TOBACCO 
CONTROL (Jun. 2, 2016), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2016/06/02/tobaccocontrol-2015-
052656.full.pdf+html.; Ron Borland & Steven Savvas, Effects of Stick Design Features on Perceptions of 
Characteristics of Cigarettes, 22 TOBACCO CONTROL 331 (2013); Maansi Bansal-Travers, et al., What do 
Cigarette Pack Colors Communicate to Smokers in the U.S.?, 40 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 683 (2011); 
Maansi Bansal-Travers, et al., The impact of Cigarette Pack Design, Descriptors, and Warning Labels on 
Risk Perception in the U.S., 40 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 674 (2011); David Hammond & Carla 
Parkinson, The Impact of Cigarette Package Design on Perceptions of Risk, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH 345 
(2009); United States v. Philip Morris USA, 449 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 430, 508, 515, 522, 526, 546–491, 609 
(D. D. C. 2006) (Findings of Fact no. 2024, 2379. 2412–14, 2448–49, 2469, 2557–73); aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095, 1119–21 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding findings of fact); Melanie 
Wakefield, et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image: New Evidence from Tobacco Industry Documents, 11 
TOBACCO CONTROL (SUPPLEMENT 1) i73, i76–i77 (2002). 
25 As discussed below, any such inserts or onserts would also need to comply with First Amendment 
standards, which might be applied more strictly to compelled speech that discourages the legal use of the 
associated product. 
26 ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977); Albert Bandura, Self-efficacy: Toward a 
Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 191 (1977); James O. Prochaska & Carlo C. 
DiClemente, Self Change Processes, Self-efficacy and Decisional Balance Across Five Stages of Smoking 
Cessation, in ADVANCES IN CANCER CONTROL: EPIDEMIOLOGY & RESEARCH 131 (Alan R. Liss ed., 
1984). 
27 James Thrasher, et al., The Use of Cigarette Package inserts to Supplement Pictorial Health 
Warnings: An Evaluation of the Canadian Policy, 17 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 870, 872–73 (2015); 
James Thrasher, et al., Cigarette package Inserts Can Promote Efficacy Beliefs and Sustained Smoking 
Cessation Attempts: A Longitudinal Assessment of an Innovative Policy in Canada, 88 PREVENTIVE MED. 
59, 61–62 (2016).  
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For FDA to require inserts or onserts for any of these different purposes, the 
Tobacco Control Act requires only that FDA determine that such inserts or onserts 
would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” and that its 
determination not be “arbitrary or capricious.”28 Related case law firmly establishes 
that nothing close to scientific certainty is required in agency determinations of this 
kind, and that the courts must give FDA’s determinations considerable deference, so 
long as the agency considers all relevant information, pro and con, and follows all the 
required procedures. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that all an 
agency must do to avoid being found “arbitrary and capricious” is “examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” and, if that has 
been done, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” 29 
But even if FDA has clear authority to require such inserts or onserts as “appropriate 
for the protection of the public health” (or through any of its other authorities in the 
Tobacco Control Act), any such requirements must also fit within the constitutional 
constraints established by the First Amendment’s protections for “commercial 
speech.” 
 
28 TCA § 912(b); 21 U.S.C. § 387l(b) (referencing the Administrative Procedures Act at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706). 
29 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. 
of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see Kroger Co. v. Reg’l Airport 
Auth., 286 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2002) (“If there is any evidence to support the agency’s decision, the 
agency’s determination is not arbitrary or capricious.”). 
Exhibit Three 
The image part with relationship ID rId8 was not found in the file.
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT-
REQUIRED INSERTS OR ONSERTS 
Members of the tobacco industry would almost certainly file First Amendment 
challenges against any FDA or other government efforts to require tobacco product 
inserts or onserts, just as they did to strike down FDA’s graphic health warning rule.30 
However, even if the existing court rulings on First Amendment protections for 
commercial speech are interpreted expansively, there appear to be ways to design 
government-required tobacco product inserts or onserts to survive any such 
constitutional attacks. 
The courts typically review government measures that require product disclosures 
or warnings (whether through labeling or product inserts or onserts) as “compelled 
commercial speech,” and apply much more permissive constitutional scrutiny than 
they do to government efforts to restrict what commercial entities may say on their 
own. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘the First Amendment interests 
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake 
when speech is actually suppressed.’’31 The standard First Amendment test for 
compelled commercial speech, initially established in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Zauderer ruling, requires that the compelled speech (e.g., a warning label or disclosure 
requirement) be “factual and uncontroversial” and “reasonably related” to the 
government’s interest (e.g., to prevent deception of consumers or reduce the possibility 
of consumer confusion), which includes not being so “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome” to “offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial 
speech.”32 
In sharp contrast, government restrictions on what commercial entities themselves 
may say about their products and services must survive the more extensive 4-part First 
Amendment test first presented in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Central Hudson case, 
which requires that: 
1. To qualify for First Amendment protection, the commercial speech must relate 
to lawful activity and not be false or misleading. 
2. The government’s asserted interest in restricting the speech must be substantial. 
3. The restriction must directly advance the government’s asserted interest. 
4. The restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted 
government interest.33 
In the appellate court case striking down FDA’s graphic health warnings rule, the 
D.C. Circuit court panel of three judges ruled two to one that the less stringent 
Zauderer test for government compelled commercial speech applied only when the 
compelled speech was directed at “preventing deception to consumers”—and that any 
compelled commercial speech (such as required inserts or onserts) directed at other 
government purposes (e.g., disclosing health and safety risks) were subject to the more 
 
30 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
31 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, n.14 (1985). 
32 Id. at 651; see Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 559 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2010); Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 21–22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
33 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 527 (2001). Lorillard Tobacco is the most recent U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of government restrictions on tobacco product advertising. 
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restrictive Central Hudson test.34 But the full D.C. Circuit (ruling en banc) directly 
reversed that ruling in the subsequent American Meat Institute case, finding that the 
less-stringent Zauderer test also applies to government compelled commercial speech 
directed at other legitimate government purposes.35 
Similarly, the Second Circuit has repeatedly found that the Zauderer test applies in 
compelled commercial disclosure cases, even when consumer deception is not at issue, 
and the Central Hudson test applies to statutes that restrict commercial speech.36 
Following that approach, it has upheld compelled commercial speech directed at 
purposes other than preventing consumer deception, including required disclosures 
directed at protecting the environment37 and at combating obesity.38 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly considered the issue, the D.C. 
and Second Circuit rulings suggest that the less stringent Zauderer test should apply 
to all cases involving compelled commercial speech directed at legitimate government 
purposes, even when those purposes are not to prevent or reduce consumer deception 
or misunderstanding.39 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that “the extension of 
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value 
to consumers of the information such speech provides.”40 That suggests that compelled 
commercial speech directed at providing consumers with any valuable information 
relating to the products at issue should qualify for the more lenient Zauderer test, 
whether it addresses consumer deception or misunderstandings or not.41 
 
34 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1213, 1217. 
35 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18 at 21–22. The ruling upheld government requirements that certain 
meat products disclose their country of origin on their labels, referencing the long history of country-of-
origin labeling directed at enabling consumers to choose American-made products, especially in regard to 
health concerns. Id. at 23–24. In an “en banc” session of a circuit court, the case is heard by all the judges 
of the circuit (typically on an appeal of a prior ruling by the typical three-judge circuit court panel), with 
all the judges in the circuit participating in the final ruling. Am. Meat Inst. was considered by eleven 
circuit court judges, with two judges dissenting from the final ruling. 
36 Safelite Grp. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 262–63 (2d Cir. 2014). 
37 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (“To be sure, the 
compelled disclosure at issue here was not intended to prevent ‘consumer confusion or deception’ per se, 
but rather to better inform consumers about the products they purchase.”) (citation omitted). 
38 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. New York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120–21, 133 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
39 In regard to a more expansive application of the Zauderer test, see Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. 
Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir. 2010) (Zauderer test applies to disclosures to address not only 
inherently misleading commercial speech but also potentially misleading commercial speech); Pharm. 
Care Mgmt Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, n. 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that a submitted brief offered no 
cases supporting its assertion that Zauderer is limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at 
consumers and that “we have found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a way”). In regard to a more 
restrictive application of the Zauderer test, see Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1210–13 (11th Cir. 
2002) (applying Central Hudson test, instead of Zauderer, to required disclosures without explanation). 
40 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
41 Coming at it the other way, the Second Circuit has stated that “consumer curiosity alone is not a 
strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate factual statement.” Int’l Dairy 
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoted favorably by both a concurring opinion 
(Kavanaugh) and a dissent (Brown) in Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2014). What 
might constitute “consumer curiosity, alone,” however, is quite controversial. See Amestov, 92 F.3d 73, 74 
(holding a Vermont law requiring the disclosure of what milk products contained milk from cows treated 
with synthetic growth hormone was unconstitutional because it was compelled speech directed solely at 
addressing consumer curiosity; with that finding largely based on an FDA determination that the milk 
from such cows was no different from milk from non-treated cows and produced no related health harms 
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Even if Zauderer were interpreted narrowly to apply only to compelled commercial 
speech relating to consumer deception, inserts or onsert directed at providing 
consumers with accurate, not misleading information about tobacco product harms and 
risks would still be likely to qualify for and pass the Zauderer test. For example, the 
Sixth Circuit refused to apply strict scrutiny instead of the Zauderer test to the Tobacco 
Control Act’s requirement that FDA issue a rule mandating graphic health warnings 
on all cigarette packs and ads, noting that disclosures of the serious risks that smoking 
involves were necessary “to avoid giving a false impression that smoking is 
innocuous” and to prevent advertising that “represents the alleged pleasures or 
satisfactions of cigarette smoking” from being deceptive.42 As detailed above, 
extensive research and court findings also firmly establish that certain ongoing 
characteristics of cigarettes and their packaging and labels continue to mislead 
smokers and others to believe, inaccurately, that some brands or sub-brands are less 
harmful than others.43 Inserts and onserts to correct those misunderstandings would fit 
under even the most narrow views of what compelled speech falls under the more 
lenient Zauderer test. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in the 2010 Milavetz case, all 
that the government must do to justify compelled speech directed at preventing 
consumers from being misled is show that likelihood of consumer deception (without 
the compelled speech) “is hardly a speculative one.”44  
It is also possible that a narrow interpretation of Zauderer, permitting compelled 
speech only to address consumer deception, would not only allow compelled speech 
to stop the products and their packaging and labeling from deceiving and misleading 
consumers but would also allow remedial compelled speech directed at addressing the 
harms caused by such misleading product, packaging, and labeling characteristics.45 
Such permitted remedial compelled speech could, for example, include inserts or 
onserts designed to provide deceived and misled consumers with information about 
how to quit successfully (if they chose to try to do so once provided with correct and 
not misleading information). 
On the other hand, it is possible that government-required tobacco product inserts 
and onserts might actually be subject to an even more lenient standard than the 
Zauderer test because they would not be seen by consumers prior to purchase and are 
 
or risks to consumers). For a critique of the court’s finding that consumer concerns about milk from cows 
treated with synthetic growth hormone amounts to only consumer curiosity and cannot justify the 
compelled speech at issue in the case, see, e.g., Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74–81 (Leval, J., dissenting) and 
Sugarman, SD, Should Food Businesses Be Able to Use the First Amendment to Resist Providing 
Consumers with Government-Mandated Public Health Messages, 5 FDLI’S FOOD AND DRUG POLICY 
FORUM Apr. 29, 2015, at 4; see also American Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 23 (compelling product country-of-
origin information includes health and safety interests and “has an historical pedigree that lifts it well 
above ‘idle curiosity’”). 
42 Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 527 6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 527 (1992)). 
43 Supra, note 24; see infra, note 71. 
44 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 559 U.S. 229, 251 (2010) (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. 
at 652). 
45 See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18, note 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (finding that compelled 
disclosures that provide purely factual and uncontroversial information “to correct deception” are subject 
to the basic Zauderer test and not subject to strict scrutiny); and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 
F.3d 1205, 1215–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing remedial disclosures to dissipate the effects of past 
deceptive representations). 
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not displayed as part of the manufacturer’s commercial speech.46 This analysis applies 
most clearly to inserts because they are inside the tobacco product package, separate 
from the external package and its label, and completely invisible to consumers prior 
to purchase. But it could also apply to onserts that do not convey any messages to 
consumers until after they detach the onsert from the package and open it up. For 
example, in a different context the D.C. Circuit Court has ruled that onserts should not 
be considered to be statements on cigarette packaging because they are not a part of 
the packaging but only affixed to the packaging.47 More generally, the existence of the 
different Zauderer and Central Hudson tests are based on the concept that less 
stringent First Amendment protections should apply to less burdensome requirements 
and restrictions relating to commercial speech, which indicates that the First 
Amendment scrutiny applied to product inserts should be less strict than for onserts, 
which should, in turn, be less strict than the First Amendment scrutiny applied to 
warnings required on external product labeling or in all product advertisements. 
A less exacting constitutional standard than the Zauderer test might also apply if 
the required tobacco product inserts or onserts clearly identify the government as the 
entity making and delivering the information they contain (making it clear that the 
information is not coming from the product manufacturers).48 In such a situation, 
“[w]here the law requires a commercial entity engaged in commercial speech merely 
to permit a disclosure by the government, rather than compelling speech out of the 
mouth of the speaker, the First Amendment interests are less obvious.”49 
Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any circuit court appears to have ruled on this 
exact issue. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, however, the Supreme Court 
ruled that requiring manufacturers of a specific product to finance generic advertising 
 
46 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1236 (dissent) (suggesting that requiring 
cigarette package inserts is less burdensome, under First Amendment analysis, than requiring warning 
labels on the packs); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfg. v. SEC., 800 F.3d 518, 522–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that a 
government compelled speech requirement unconnected to voluntary advertising or to product labeling at 
the point of sale is not compelled commercial speech subject to the Zauderer test). Although the Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfg. case applied the more stringent Central Hudson test to the compelled speech at issue, that 
was based on a finding that requiring certain public disclosures on company websites and in their regular 
reports to the SEC faced even stronger First Amendment constraints than requiring disclosures in product 
ads or labeling, and inserts or onserts are not as publicly visible or as directly and formally linked to the 
product’s manufacturer as disclosures on company’s own website or in its own SEC filings. See, also, the 
dissent in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfg., noting the “strange” and “highly curious results” from providing stronger 
First Amendment protections for compelled statements on websites and SEC filings than for compelled 
statements on product labels or advertising, which “would impose a more searching First Amendment 
standard on a disclosure that imposes a less burdensome requirement on the speaker.” Id. at 535. 
47 U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1140–42 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that the tobacco 
companies consider onserts to be different from packaging or labeling on the packaging). 
48 See, e.g., CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, F. Supp. 3d (USDC, ND CA, 2015) 
(“There is a persuasive argument that, where, as here, the compelled disclosure is that of clearly identified 
government speech, and not that of the private speaker, a standard even less exacting than that established 
in Zauderer should apply.”). 
49 Id.  In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down a law requiring a utility to include a third party’s newsletter, clearly identified as such, in the 
utility’s monthly billing statements to consumers. 475 U.S. 1 (1986). But the compelled speech in Pacific 
Gas was political not commercial speech, controversial opinion (including views hostile to or biased 
against the utility), neither factual nor noncontroversial information, and was from a third party not the 
government. Accordingly, it does not contradict the idea that compelled factual and noncontroversial 
commercial speech that would otherwise fit under the Zauderer test should be subject to an even less 
restrictive test if it is clearly identified as coming from the government and not the manufacturer. 
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by the government about the product does not raise any compelled speech or other 
First Amendment issues, even when the affected businesses objected to the 
government’s message.50 That ruling made a sharp distinction between compelling 
support for government speech, where the First Amendment does not apply, and either 
compelling individuals to personally express government messages as their own or 
compelling individuals or businesses to subsidize speech made by non-government 
third parties, where the First Amendment does apply.51 Following that same logic, a 
government-required insert or onsert that, on its face, clearly presents only government 
speech, with no implied endorsement by the tobacco product manufacturer, would 
appear to raise no First Amendment issues, especially where the manufacturer’s ability 
to deliver its own messages would not be restricted by the requirement.52 
 
50 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); see also Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by 
the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. That freedom in part reflects the fact 
that it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech.” 
(internal citation omitted)). At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Wooley v. Maynard—
that the First Amendment prohibits state governments from requiring license plates with ideological 
government messages (New Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” motto)—remains good law. 430 U.S. 705 
(1977), cited favorably in Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2252 (2015). That ruling would not apply to insert or onsert requirements that did not include any political 
or ideological messages. It also might not apply to required inserts or onserts with ideological messages 
because they, unlike license plates, are not “mobile billboards” required on a “virtual necessity for most 
Americans” that is inescapably visible to large numbers of the public. 430 US. at 1435. It also appears that 
the ideological government speech on license plates struck down in Wooley v. Maynard was not clearly 
labeled as coming only from the government. 
51 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557–59; see also Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015). The 5-4 ruling in Walker v. Texas Div. split sharply as to whether state-
issued license plates were government speech if, besides certain non-ideological government messages, 
they displayed different government-approved messages that expressed individual vehicle owners’ 
personal views that were not necessarily a government viewpoint (e.g., “Rather Be Golfing”). But 
government-required inserts or onserts would pass both the majority and the dissent opinions’ tests for 
government speech. They pass the majority’s test because: (a) product inserts and onserts have “long 
communicated messages from the government” (e.g., in prescription and over-the-counter drugs); (b) 
government-required inserts and onserts are “often closely identified in the public mind with the 
[government];’” (c) the government “has sole control” over the content of the inserts or onserts; (d) inserts 
and onserts (or product packaging) are not “traditional public forums for private speech;” and (e) the 
inserts and onserts “are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message” (e.g., 
would have indicia that their messages are owned and conveyed by the government). 135 S. Ct. at 2248–
50, 2252. Similarly, they qualify as government speech under the dissent’s test because: (a) governments 
have long used inserts and onserts “as a means of expressing a government message;” (b) there is no 
history of manufacturers allowing their products to be used as the site of inserts or onserts “that do not 
express messages that the [manufacturers] wish to convey;” (c) product packages can accommodate “only 
a limited number” of inserts or onserts; and (d) neither manufacturers nor consumers could pay to have 
certain messages included in the inserts or onserts. Id. at 2258–59. 
52 See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Compelling Product Sellers to Transmit Government Public 
Health Messages” 29 J.L. & POLITICS 557 (2014); Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled 
Commercial Speech, 50 WASHINGTON UNIV. J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2016). An argument might be made that 
requiring government-message inserts or onserts would impede the manufacturers’ ability to communicate 
to consumers through their own inserts or onserts. But manufacturers would not be prohibited from using 
their own inserts or onserts, and they could still use all other avenues of communication that are available 
to them to communicate with consumers. While having more than one insert or onsert might reduce 
consumer attention to one or both, it might also increase consumer awareness because of the novelty. In 
any case, the insert-onsert situation is quite different from required government warning labels on 
cigarette package that cover a large percentage of the display area, thereby preventing the manufacturer 
from using that are for its own messaging (although even there manufacturers could increase their display 
space by increasing the overall size of the package). 
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Even if the courts found that requiring a commercial product to deliver what was 
clearly the government’s own speech still raised First Amendment issues, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Johanns indicates that such compelled speech clearly 
identified as coming exclusively from the government should be subject to lesser First 
Amendment scrutiny compared to whatever the court might have applied if the speech 
were not identified as the government’s own. In addition, any such First Amendment 
concerns should be much weaker regarding insert or onsert requirements as opposed 
to required warning labels on product packages or labels, where (unlike with inserts 
or onserts) the required speech is seen prior to purchase and takes up product 
packaging space that the manufacturer could otherwise use for its own speech. 
Regardless of which First Amendment test or standard might be applied, they all 
require that the content of any government-compelled speech be accurate and not 
misleading to avoid being struck down. In addition, to satisfy the Zauderer test 
(however interpreted), the compelled speech must also be “purely factual and 
uncontroversial.”53 In a recent D.C. Circuit case, the court stated that 
“‘uncontroversial, as a legal test, must mean something different than ‘purely 
factual.’”54 It found that the required speech at issue, although it could be seen as 
factual, failed the Zauderer test because it was ideological and metaphorical and 
suggested that the products were ethically tainted, which was a value judgment that 
could be contested.55 
In the D.C. Circuit’s earlier RJ Reynolds case striking down FDA’s final cigarette 
warning label rule, the court found that compelled speech cannot qualify as “purely 
factual and noncontroversial” if it includes graphic images that, while not “patently 
false” can be misunderstood; are “primarily intended to evoke an emotional response 
 
53 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.626, 651 (1985); see also National 
Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that Zauderer “requires the 
disclosure to be of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ about the good or service being 
offered”) (quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). That 
same opinion also discussed how opinions could be disguised as facts, and the difficulty in distinguishing 
between opinions and facts. National Ass’n of Manufacturers, 800 F.3d at 528. 
54 National Ass’n of Manufacturers, 800 F.3d at 528.  But see Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. 
U.S., 674 F.3d 509, n. 8 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that to apply the Zauderer test the compelled speech need 
not be noncontroversial but only accurate and factual). 
55 Id. at 528–31. As the dissent noted, the compelled speech at issue (“not been found to be ‘DRC 
conflict free’”) communicated “truthful, factual information about a product to investors and consumers: it 
tells them that a product has not been found to be free of minerals originating in the DRC or adjoining 
countries that may finance armed groups.” 800 F.3d at 532. For more in the dissent on the meaning of 
“noncontroversial,” see 800 F.3d at 537–39;  see also Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27 (finding compelled 
country-of-origin labeling factual and noncontroversial); Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y.C., F.3d 233, note 
6 (compelling pregnancy services centers to state the City’s treatment preferences or to mention 
controversial pregnancy-related services which some centers oppose would be “controversial” if the 
Zauderer test applied); CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. City and Cnty of S.F., 494 F. App’x 752, 753–54 (9th Cir. 
2012) (compelled commercial speech “controversial’ because it included City’s recommendations that 
could be interpreted as City’s opinion that using cell phones is dangerous, which had not been 
established); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953, 966–67 (9th Cir. 
2009) (compelled speech labeling a video game as violent fails Zauderer test because it is controversial 
opinion not purely factual information); New York State Rest. Ass’n v. New York City Bd. of Health, 556 
F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (compelled calorie counts in restaurant menus “factual and noncontroversial” 
despite objections that calorie amount disclosures should not be prioritized higher than other nutrient 
amounts); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (compelled speech 
indicating that video game is “sexually explicit” not “factual or noncontroversial” because based on 
State’s opinion-based definition).  
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or, at most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the textual warning; are 
“not warnings but admonitions,” and are “unabashed attempts to . . . browbeat 
consumers into quitting.”56 Similarly, both the majority opinion and the dissent found 
that including the phone number “1-800-QUIT-NOW” in the warning labels, as an 
exhortation to quit, was not “purely informational,” either.57 
Raising a possible additional constraint, a footnote in the majority opinion in R.J. 
Reynolds stated that: “Like the district court, we are skeptical that the government can 
assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful 
product, even one that has been conclusively linked to adverse health consequences.”58 
Although this statement is only dictum (not binding precedent), it raises the possibility 
that future court rulings might determine that—regardless of what First amendment 
test is applied and regardless of what substantial interest the government asserts—the 
government may not compel commercial speech by tobacco product manufacturers 
that includes any direct encouragement for adults not to purchase or use the 
manufacturers’ tobacco products so long as those tobacco products are lawful 
products. However, while the dissent in R.J. Reynolds noted that the “QUIT NOW” 
command in FDA-required cigarette warning labels “directly contradicts the tobacco 
companies’ desired message at the point of sale, thereby imposing a significant burden 
on their protected commercial speech,” it did not suggest that such compelled speech 
discouraging the use of the companies’ products was incompatible with the First 
Amendment. Instead, the dissent stated only that the “QUIT NOW” command could 
not be sustained under the Central Hudson test unless the government could explain 
why a less burdensome “alternative means of connecting smokers to cessation 
resources, such as a package insert,” would be inadequate.59 
The R.J. Reynolds ruling was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and it is not 
yet clear how the Supreme Court might handle a similar case. In the meantime, the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in the Zauderer case remain controlling law, clearly 
establishing that any government compelled commercial speech (including inserts or 
onserts) must not only present “purely factual and uncontroversial information” but 
must also be “reasonably related” to a substantial government interest.”60 
 
56 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012). But see Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., 674 F.3d at 526, 560–61 (finding that the Tobacco Control Act’s graphic 
health warnings requirement for cigarettes did not violate Zauderer, despite the fact that “there can be no 
doubt that the FDA’s choice of visual images is subjective, and that graphic, full-color images, because of 
the inherently persuasive character of the visual medium, cannot be presumed neutral.”). 
57 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17 (“the provocatively named hotline cannot rationally be 
viewed as pure attempts to convey information to consumers” but is an “unabashed attempt[] to evoke 
emotion . . . and browbeat consumers into quitting.”). Id. at 1236 (“the number is prominently presented in 
imperative terms, directing consumers to ‘QUIT NOW.’ That command directly contradicts the 
companies’ desired message at the point of sale, thereby imposing a significant burden on their protected 
commercial speech.”). But the focus of these discussions on the 1-800-QUIT-NOW number, itself, 
indicates that providing a neutral phone number or website address that consumers could use to obtain 
information—with no exhortations to quit in the number, address, or the associated sources—would be 
purely informational. 
58 Id. at 1218 n. 13. 
59 Id. at 1236–37 (emphasis added). 
60 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.626, 651 (1985); see also Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A v. U.S., 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010). 
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Zauderer notes that “unjustified or unduly burdensome [compelled speech] might 
offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”61 But Zauderer 
also states that such concerns do not apply “as long as [the compelled speech] 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers;”62 and the U.S. Supreme Court followed that ruling in the Milavetz case, 
its most recent compelled speech case.63 
Moreover, the courts have not found warning labels that use large portions of the 
main display portions of product packaging to be overly burdensome;64 and required 
inserts or onserts would be even less burdensome in that regard. It is possible, 
however, that a court might still find a government insert or onsert requirement overly 
burdensome if it were extremely costly for manufacturers to comply. But such cost 
concerns would not arise so long as the inserts or onserts did not require major changes 
to the packaging currently used for the tobacco products and roughly paralleled the 
insert and onsert requirements, and related costs, currently imposed on manufacturers 
in other areas, such as prescription and over-the-counter drugs. It would also be hard 
for the tobacco industry to argue that insert and onsert requirements are overly 
burdensome when they have been using both for their own purposes for decades.65 
IV. HOW MIGHT FDA DESIGN A NEW INSERT-ONSERT RULE 
TO COMPLY WITH EXISTING FIRST AMENDMENT CASE 
LAW 
As discussed above, the existing case law suggests that a new FDA rule requiring 
tobacco product inserts or onserts would almost certainly avoid First Amendment 
constraints if the inserts or onserts: 
(a) Were purely factual, informative, and noncontroversial (which would also 
make them accurate and not misleading).66 
(b) Provided consumers with valuable information about the tobacco products, 
such as information about the tobacco products’ harms and risks, how to use 
the products to minimize harms and risks, and how to dispose of the products 
safely. 
 
61 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
62 Id. 
63 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., 559 U.S. at 250. 
64 In the R.J. Reynolds case, for example, the tobacco companies challenging the graphic health 
warnings did not dispute Congress’s authority to require health warnings on cigarette packs, did not 
challenge the substance of any of the health warning text in the graphic health warnings, and did not 
challenge the size or placement of the warning labels (e.g., top 50% of the front and back of the pack). 
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211, 1215. In an earlier case, members of the tobacco industry did challenge 
the size and placement of the required cigarette warning labels and similar requirements for new non-
graphic smokeless tobacco product warning labels (covering 30% of the front and back of the packaging), 
arguing that they were unduly burdensome because they would effectively overshadow and dominate their 
own commercial speech; but the 6th Circuit ruled against them. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. U.S., 
674 F.3d 509, 530–31 (6th Cir. 2012). 
65 See, e.g., GERARD S. PETRONE, TOBACCO ADVERTISING: THE GREAT SEDUCTION 54–60, 147–48, 
154–55 (1996); ARLENE B. HIRSCHFELDER, ENCYCLOPEDIA ON SMOKING AND TOBACCO 2–3 (1999). 
66 To be prudent, this standard should also be applied to the content of any website or other external 
sources that the insert or onsert referred to or incorporated (e.g., by providing a website address or phone 
number). 
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(c) Were required in order to address consumer ignorance that could mislead 
consumers or otherwise prevent or reduce consumer deception or 
misunderstandings about the products and their use and related consequences. 
(d) Were unambiguously identified as coming from the government or some unit 
of the government (and not from the products’ manufacturers).67 
(e) Were not extremely costly or difficult for manufacturers to implement. 
More rigorous First Amendment obstacles could arise, however, if the required inserts 
or onserts included text or graphic images that were subject to different interpretations 
or provoked emotional responses, or if they explicitly encouraged specific consumer 
behaviors contrary to the manufacturer’s interests, such as not buying the product in 
the first place, quitting all future use, or switching to less harmful tobacco or nicotine 
products. To avoid this risk, such elements could simply be omitted.68 
At the same time, it should be perfectly acceptable under existing First Amendment 
law regarding compelled commercial speech if any FDA-required inserts or onserts 
provided consumers with accurate, not misleading, factual information about the 
health benefits from terminating or sharply reducing use of the subject tobacco product 
or from switching completely to using a less harmful tobacco or nicotine-delivery 
product—and perhaps even about how to quit successfully for those that choose on 
their own to do so—so long as there were no controversial or misleading graphic 
images, emotional appeals, or actual exhortations to quit or switch. 
Although there are no court rulings directly on point, an FDA rule requiring such 
inserts or onserts should readily fall under the relaxed Zauderer test, even if Zauderer 
were held to apply only to compelled speech directed at reducing consumer deception 
and misunderstandings. As noted previously, courts have already found that informing 
consumers about tobacco use risks and harms qualifies as addressing consumer 
deception and related misleading commercial speech;69 and also providing information 
on how to quit successfully would help to correct the harms caused by past deceptive 
or misleading speech that have misled consumers to start or not try to quit.70 Moreover, 
it would not be difficult to show that providing the above-described information to 
consumers through inserts or onserts is “reasonably related” to the goal of reducing 
consumer misunderstandings and preventing consumer deception relating to such 
matters as the health benefits (or lack thereof) from: (a) switching between brands or 
sub-brands; (b) reducing one’s consumption to different degrees; (c) switching 
completely to using a less-harmful product compared to engaging in dual use; or (d) 
quitting completely versus other harm reduction strategies.71 
 
67 Such clear attribution would ensure that consumers did not inaccurately think that the compelled 
speech messages were voluntarily coming from the manufacturer, thereby eliminating any risk of the 
government actually putting words into the manufacturers’ mouths. 
68 For example, any use of the 1-800-QUIT-NOW phone number in the inserts or onserts could be 
switched to only listing the actual numbers in the phone number. 
69 See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., 674 F.3d at 527 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 527 (1992)). 
70 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1215–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
71 On consumer ignorance or misunderstandings relating to tobacco products and their use, risks, 
and harms, and to how to reduce harms and risks. See, e.g., Olivia A Wackowkski & Christine D. 
Delnevo, Young Adults Risk Perceptions of Various Tobacco Products Relative to Cigarettes: Results 
from the National Young Adult Health Survey, 43 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 328–36 (2015); Maria 
Roditis, et al., Adolescent (Mis)perceptions about Nicotine Addiction: Results from a Mixed-methods 
Study, 43 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 156–64 (Apr. 2015); Mark T. Kivinlemi & Lynn T. Kozlowski, 
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If the reviewing court found that Zauderer applied more broadly (beyond just 
preventing deception), it would be quite easy to establish that such purely 
informational disclosures or messages were also “reasonably related” to various 
alternative government interests, such as: (a) having adult consumers make more fully 
informed decisions about tobacco product use; (b) providing helpful information to 
the many smokers and other tobacco users who want to quit but have not been able to 
do so successfully because of their addiction; (c) preventing youth initiation and use; 
or even (d) reducing overall tobacco use and harms. 
But if FDA wanted to require tobacco product inserts or onserts specifically to 
prevent and reduce youth tobacco use or to reduce overall tobacco use harms as 
effectively as possible, the agency would likely want to use such potentially helpful 
tools for breaking through the addictive power of cigarettes and other tobacco products 
as emotional appeals; not-purely-informational graphic images; or direct exhortations 
to quit, reduce use, or switch to less-harmful products. Including such elements in the 
inserts and onserts, however, could trigger the application of the more restrictive 
Central Hudson test. Accordingly, FDA would not want to include any of those 
elements unless it had formally determined that doing so would likely make the inserts 
or onserts significantly more effective at preventing youth use or reducing overall 
tobacco use harms–and based that determination on a careful consideration of the 
available relevant research and evidence, both pro and con. 
In this regard, new research showing what specific elements or characteristics in 
tobacco product inserts or onserts would make them most effective at promoting 
different possible government goals would be especially helpful. In particular, 
research showing that including emotional appeals, different types of graphic images, 
and direct exhortations to quit, cut back, or switch in inserts or onserts would make 
them more effective at preventing youth initiation, promoting cessation, or otherwise 
reducing tobacco use harms would make it easier to pass the part of the Central 
Hudson test requiring a reasonable government determination that the inserts and 
onserts would directly promote the government’s substantial interests.72 
To satisfy the remainder of the Central Hudson test, FDA would also have to 
establish that there were no equally or more effective ways to promote the government 
interests that would interfere less with the manufacturer’s protected commercial 
 
Deficiencies in Public Understanding about Tobacco Harm Reduction: Results from a United States 
National Survey, 12 HARM REDUCTION J. 21 (2015); Marianna Masiero, et al., Personal Fable: Optimistic 
Bias in Cigarette Smokers, INT. J. HIGH RISK BEHAVS. & ADDICTION (Mar. 4, 2015), http://hf9an6bn9s.
search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=
info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajo
urnal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Personal+Fable%3A+Optimistic+Bias+in+Cigarette+Smokers&rft.jtitle
=International+Journal+of+High+Risk+Behaviors+and+Addiction&rft.au=Masiero%2C+Marianna&rft.a
u=Lucchiari%2C+Claudio&rft.au=Pravettoni%2C+Gabriella&rft.date=2015-03-20&rft.issn=2251-
8711&rft.eissn=2251-872X&rft.volume=4&rft.issue=1&rft_id=info:doi/10.5812%2Fijhrba.20939&
rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_5812_ijhrba_20939&paramdict=en-US; Marcella H. 
Boynton, et al., Understanding How Perceptions of Tobacco Constituents and FDA Relate to Effective 
and Credible Tobacco Risk Messaging: a National Phone Survey of U.S. Adults 2014-2015, 16 BMC PUB. 
HEALTH 516 (June 23, 2016), http://0-search.proquest.com.gull.georgetown.edu/docview/1800708645
?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=36339; Christing D. Czoli, et al., How Do Consumers Perceive 
Differences in Risk Across Nicotine Products? A Review of Relative Risk Perceptions Across Smokeless 
Tobacco, E-Cigarettes, Nicotine Replacement Therapy and Combustible Cigarettes, TOBACCO CONTROL 
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2016/09/13/tobaccocontrol-2016-053060. 
72 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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speech.73 That should not be too difficult because required inserts or onserts would 
burden manufacturers’ commercial speech rights far less then advertising or labeling 
restrictions or compelled speech in product advertising or on product packaging or 
labels.74 Most notably, consumers would not even see the inserts until after making a 
decision to purchase the product, the inserts would not obscure any manufacturer 
commercial speech made through externally visible packaging and labeling, and the 
inserts would not be visible to the general public. It is hard to imagine any other form 
of government-compelled speech to deliver information or other messages to product 
consumers that could possibly be less burdensome to the manufacturers’ speech than 
product inserts.75 
Onserts that did not present any messages to consumers until detached from the 
package and opened would share these same less-burdensome characteristics with 
inserts, except for temporarily obscuring the part of the tobacco product package 
where the onsert was affixed (which could be its warning label). But an onsert could 
be harder to defend against First Amendment attacks if it were required to be affixed 
to the front of the tobacco product package, obscuring more of the manufacturer’s 
commercial speech, or if it included text visible before purchase that directly 
contradicted the manufacturers’ “Buy-Me” protected speech at point of sale (e.g., by 
the visible onsert stating “QUIT NOW”). Even then, however, research showing that 
such characteristics were necessary to make the onsert work more effectively to 
promote the government’s substantial interests would make placing those burdens on 
the manufacturer’s speech more constitutionally permissible. 
 
73 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 583 (2011) (“government laws and regulations may 
significantly restrict speech, as long as they also ‘directly advance’ a ‘substantial’ government interest that 
could not ‘be served as well by a more limited restriction,’” quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 
(emphasis added)); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (“if the Government 
could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the 
Government must do so.”); Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
74 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that requiring cigarette package inserts is less burdensome, under First 
Amendment analysis, than requiring warning labels on the packs). 
75 There are, of course, other ways that the government could deliver information or other messages 
to tobacco product consumers, such as government consumer education campaigns, that would be less 
burdensome to the tobacco product manufacturers. Whether the courts might consider such non-
compelled-speech alternatives if and when the fourth part of the Central Hudson test applies to an insert or 
onsert requirement is not clear. If they were considered, however, such government communications 
would not likely qualify as equally effective alternatives available to the government to promote the 
government’s substantial interests because the alternatives would be much less successful at directly 
reaching all tobacco product consumers, compared to product inserts and onserts, and would not reach the 
consumers when they have the product in their hands and are likely to be most receptive to considering 
product-related information or messaging. Because they would be entirely separate from the tobacco 
products and their use, such government messaging would also be less effective than inserts or onserts at 
preventing those consumer misunderstandings caused by the product, itself, and by its packaging and 
labeling. In addition, if the government-required inserts or onserts were directed at minimizing youth 
initiation, maximizing cessation, or otherwise minimizing overall tobacco use or harms, it would be odd 
for a court to find that the government must not use certain effective tools at all because other effective 
tools are available when achieving the government’s substantial interests would benefit from employing 
all available tools until the government’s substantial interests were actually achieved. In other words, even 
if the government implemented a strong tobacco product consumer education campaign (or took other 
alternative action toward minimizing tobacco use and harms) that would not eliminate the need to require 
inserts or onserts, as well, in order to promote the government’s substantial interests even more 
substantially and quickly. 
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Clearly, FDA has the statutory authority to require tobacco product inserts or 
onserts and could structure a new insert-onsert rule to fit within existing First 
Amendment constraints. Although currently available research and other evidence 
provides a sufficient basis for such FDA action, additional research would not only 
provide additional support but could also enable FDA to require inserts or onserts with 
additional specific characteristics and elements that would work even more directly 
and effectively to reduce tobacco use and its harms. 
V.    OTHER LEGAL ISSUES WITH INSERT OR ONSERT 
REQUIREMENTS AND HOW FDA COULD ADDRESS THEM 
If FDA were to require inserts or onserts on cigarette packs or any other tobacco 
product packaging to provide consumers with information about product risks or 
harms or how to reduce them, tobacco product companies might argue (as they have 
in regard to government required warning labels) that complying with the insert-onsert 
requirement had reduced or eliminated any legal duty the tobacco companies 
otherwise had to warn or educate consumers, or even not to mislead consumers, 
through product packaging and labeling or other means.76 This argument could be 
refuted, however, if the law authorizing or establishing an insert or onsert requirement 
explicitly stated that nothing in the insert or onsert requirement shall be construed to 
affect the legal duties of any tobacco product manufacturer, distributor, or seller, or 
any related legal actions. The Tobacco Control Act already has some provisions of this 
type built into it that cover subsequent FDA tobacco control rulemaking, but they 
could be fortified or supplemented.77 In addition, FDA could explicitly state in any 
new insert-onsert rule that it did not intend the rule to provide any new legal 
protections for any tobacco industry members or to preempt any other laws 
establishing duties on tobacco product manufacturers to warn or inform consumers. 
To provide additional protection against possible tobacco industry legal challenges, 
any new FDA insert-onsert rule could also provide a formal process that affected 
manufacturers could initiate to propose any changes to the required inserts or onserts 
necessary to make them more accurate, complete, and not misleading.78 The Tobacco 
Control Act already provides for ways that interested parties can attempt to initiate 
FDA action relating to tobacco products, including amendments to FDA rules.79 But 
the process proposed here would provide tobacco manufacturers and other interested 
 
76 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523–25 (1992). For an example of FDA-
required labeling and inserts preempting a products liability claim outside of the tobacco context, see 
Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 1997). 
77 See TCA §§ 4(a), 916(b) (21 U.S.C. § 387p(b)), 908(b) (21 U.S.C. § 387h(b)); see also Comprehensive 
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act (CSTHEA) at 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c).  
78 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572–73 (2009) (stating that a failure-to-warn claim 
against drug manufacturer is not preempted where manufacturer did not seek to update FDA label after 
learning of safety risks); Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 800–01 (8th Cir. 2001) (Bye, J., 
dissenting) (stating no preemption of failure-to-warn claim against medical device manufacturer when 
FDA procedures enabled the medical device manufacturer to add new warnings of a newly-discovered 
risk to the FDA-approved medical device label and then initiate a process to get formal approval of the 
changes). 
79 See, e.g., TCA § 901(d) (21 U.S.C. § 387a(d)) and the related provisions of the Administrative 
Procedures Act; for FDA product standard amendments, see TCA § 907(c), (d)(4) (21 U.S.C. § 387g(c), 
(d)(4)). 
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parties a more direct and dispositive tool for seeking and securing timely corrections 
and improvements to the required inserts or onserts (e.g., by including related agency 
deadlines). To place more responsibility on the tobacco product manufacturers, the 
process could also require that they provide FDA with any relevant new research or 
other information relating to the accuracy, completeness, or effectiveness of the 
information provided in the inserts or onserts that the manufacturers develop or 
otherwise obtain that is not publicly available. 
Establishing an administrative process that tobacco product manufacturers or others 
could use to correct or update any required inserts and onserts could also strengthen 
the insert-onsert rule’s defenses against First Amendment attacks. On the front end, 
the courts would likely look even more favorably on an industry-challenged insert-
onsert rule if it not only appeared to require inserts or onserts that, based on available 
research and other evidence, were wholly accurate, purely informational, and not 
misleading but also offered an explicit and effective process that manufacturers and 
others could initiate to revise the compelled speech if any new research or information 
appeared which established that the inserts or onserts were not accurate, purely 
informational, and not misleading.80 On the back end, offering such a process would 
provide manufacturers a way to prompt FDA to fix the required inserts or onserts in a 
timely fashion whenever new evidence showed that doing so was necessary for 
constitutional compliance–instead of having to take the more extreme action of 
immediately bringing a new lawsuit to try to strike down the entire requirement.81 
When used, this provided process would either produce a government agency 
determination, based on its expert review of the new research and evidence, that no 
First Amendment violations were occurring and no modifications to the required 
compelled speech were necessary, or prompt agency action to revise the compelled 
speech to eliminate any constitutional violations while still continuing to promote the 
government’s related interests or purposes. Because these administrative outcomes 
would either resolve the issue completely (making any subsequent court review 
unnecessary) or provide a more complete evidentiary record and more refined 
controversy for any subsequent court review, the courts would likely require the 
tobacco companies to use this process to exhaust their administrative remedies before 
bringing any such constitutional challenges to the courts.82 To make such required 
 
80 The existing authorities and procedures for FDA to take action, unilaterally or in response to 
petitions from interested persons, to stop enforcing an implemented final rule or to amend it would likely 
be legally adequate, by themselves, to account for the possibility that future research or other information 
might show that the established rule is actually unconstitutional or otherwise flawed or inappropriate.  Id.  
But the new administrative process suggested here would provide even stronger protections and 
procedures to account for that possibility. 
81 When constitutional rights are at issue, such agency procedures need to provide for administrative 
relief, when deserved, “within a specified, reasonable time,” or the manufacturer could be free to go 
straight to the courts for relief, instead. See, e.g., Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 
1009 (9th Cir. 2003). 
82 The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) explicitly provides that parties seeking judicial review 
under the APA (e.g., to seek relief for alleged agency APA violations during the rulemaking process) need 
not exhaust administrative remedies unless they are specifically required to do by an applicable statute or 
rule, and does not allow courts to require any such exhaustion beyond that required by statute or rule.  5 
U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993).  Here, however, the complaining 
parties would not be claiming any violations of the APA during the rule’s development and 
implementation.  Instead, they would be challenging the constitutionality of an already established rule 
based on the subsequent appearance of new research or other new evidence, and there would be no new 
final agency action for the parties to challenge.  Accordingly, the APA’s provisions relating to exhaustion 
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prior exhaustion of administrative remedies even more certain, FDA’s rule 
establishing this new process for prompting agency review and possible remedial 
action could directly require affected parties to use the process whenever they become 
aware of any new research or other evidence that they believe makes the required 
insert-onsert text false or misleading or unconstitutional.   
Existing provisions in the Tobacco Control Act already allow interested third parties 
to petition FDA to amend an established rule;83 and the courts might consider them to 
be sufficiently explicit and dispositive to constitute available administrative remedies 
that manufacturers must exhaust before using new research or other new evidence to 
attack an already established insert or onsert requirement in court.84 But the more 
explicit and dispositive new procedures proposed here, with specific agency deadlines, 
would more easily and certainly qualify as a readily available administrative remedy 
that is neither “futile” nor “inadequate to prevent irreparable injury” which 
manufacturers must, consequently, exhaust before taking their related claims to 
court85–especially if the final insert-onsert rule also required manufacturers to submit 
any new research or other information they subsequently developed or obtained that 
indicated that the messaging in the required inserts or onserts was inaccurate, not 
purely informational, or misleading so that the agency could make any necessary 
changes to the messaging.86 
 
should not apply, and the courts should have discretion to require the parties to exhaust their 
administrative remedies before receiving judicial review. See, e.g., Darby, 509 U.S. at 153–54 (stating that 
“the exhaustion doctrine continues to apply as a matter of judicial discretion in cases not governed by 
the APA”); Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160, 1167–70 (10th Cir. 2012); Volvo GM Heavy Truck 
Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor, 118 F3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the “cause of action is based on an 
alleged constitutional violation, . . . and would not be subject to the APA’s exhaustion requirement”); see 
also Committee of Blind Vendors v. District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that 
the “APA is inapplicable because no agency proceeding took place for the court to review”).  In general, 
the fact that a plaintiff raises constitutional claims does not interfere with the operation of the exhaustion 
doctrine and can even make exhaustion of available administrative remedies more appropriate.  See, 
e.g., Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. 
v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 771–72 (1947)); see also Blackbear v. Norton, 93 F. App’x. 192, 194 (10th Cir. 
2004) (“[C]onstitutional claims against federal agencies can be heard in federal court prior to 
administrative exhaustion, only where those claims are ‘collateral to the substantive issues of the 
administrative proceedings.’ (internal citations omitted.) In this case, plaintiffs' constitutional claims 
appear to be central, not collateral, rendering this exception to exhaustion inapplicable.”); Nationsbank 
Corp. v. Herman, 174 F.3d 424, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (reviewing “unambiguous line of cases rejecting the 
contention that constitutional claims should be exempt from exhaustion requirements”).  In addition, none 
of the major exceptions to the exhaustion requirement would apply in this situation.  For example, there is 
no “clear and unambiguous violation of statutory or constitutional rights” and exhausting administrative 
remedies is neither futile nor “clearly and demonstrably inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.” Tutein 
v. Insite Towers, LLC, 572 F. App’x. 107, 111 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lavellee Northside Civic Ass’n v. 
Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Mgmt. Comm’n, 866 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Shearson v. 
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 2013); U.S. ex re. Saint Mohawk Tribe v. President R.C., 451 F.3d 44, 
50 (2d Cir. 2006); Eastern Bridge, LLC v. Chao, 320 F.3d 84, 89, 91 (1st Cir. 2003). 
83 See, e.g., supra note 79.. 
84 See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Physicians v. FDA, 358 F. App’x 179, 180–81 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Biotics 
Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1983). 
85 Tutein, 572 F. App’x. at 111 (quoting Lavellee Northside Civic Ass’n v. Virgin Islands Coastal 
Zone Mgmt. Comm’n, 866 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1989)).  See also Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594; U.S. ex rel. 
Saint Mohawk Tribe, 451 F.3d at 50; Eastern Bridge, LLC, 320 F.3d at 89.   
86  Because this proposed process relates to possible new legal challenges that arise after a final rule 
is implemented, based on the subsequent emergence of new research or other evidence, it is not 
invalidated or otherwise affected by the fact that the Tobacco Control Act provides for any legal 
2017 TOBACCO PRODUCT INSERTS & ONSERTS 25 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Tobacco product inserts or onserts provide an effective way for governments to 
deliver constructive information and guidance to consumers and to promote related 
public health goals, yet they are rarely used or even considered. This paper has shown 
that FDA has clear statutory authority to implement tobacco product insert or onsert 
requirements to educate and inform consumers about tobacco product use, harms and 
risks; to promote tobacco use cessation and prevent initiation and relapse; or to protect 
or promote the public health in other ways. In addition, any new FDA insert-onsert 
rule would face more permissive First Amendment hurdles than those confronting 
rules requiring warning labels on tobacco product labels, packaging or ads. Indeed, 
FDA could readily design a new insert-onsert rule to be entirely consistent with any 
First Amendment constraints on compelling or restricting the commercial speech of 
tobacco product manufacturers that the courts might reasonably apply.87 
Additional research regarding the effectiveness of different types of inserts or 
onserts to promote different possible government interests would provide increased 
insight into their value and effectiveness compared to other tobacco control options 
available to FDA and to other governments. Such new, additional research could also 
fortify the existing research and other evidence that would support any new insert-
onsert requirements against the First Amendment challenges and other legal attacks 
that members of the tobacco industry would likely bring to try to avoid or delay having 
to comply. 
 
 
 
challenges to a new FDA final rule establishing or amending a product standard to be filed in court within 
30 days after they are promulgated, with no prior exhaustion of possible administrative remedies. TCA 
§ 912(a)(1)(A) (21 § U.S.C. 387l(a)(1)(A)). 
87 It is also possible that state, local, or Tribal governments could establish their own insert or onsert 
requirements for tobacco products sold within their borders. But they would need to be carefully 
structured to avoid federal preemption, especially if FDA had already established a conflicting nationally 
required tobacco product insert or onsert requirement. Eric N. Lindblom, et al., The Legal Framework for 
Using Tobacco Product Inserts and Onserts to Help Consumers Make More Informed Choices and to 
Reduce Tobacco Use Harms, O’NEILL INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 2, at 24–32, 40 (July 6, 2016), 
www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/resources/documents/legalframeworkinsertsonserts.pdf.  
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